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The Emergence of New Resettlement Countries: 
A Human Rights Norm Cascade?*1
Changrok Soh, Minwoo Kim, and Youngsoo Yu
Resettlement is the major instrument of protection for vulnerable refugees. Since the first pilot 
programs in Ireland, Brazil, and Chile in 1998 and 1999, developing countries in Latin America, 
Europe, and Asia, have launched their own annual resettlement programs, to many observers’ surprise. 
Does the emergence of new resettlement countries, particularly outside of Western Europe and North 
America, imply the diffusion of human rights norms? This study explores the motivational factors 
accounting for the acceptance of resettlement from the perspective of policy diffusion: coercion, 
competition, learning, and emulation. The results of this study suggest that coercion by the international 
or regional refugee regimes and competition between countries rather than ideational change regarding 
human rights norms played primary roles in these cases. 
Keywords: Resettlement, Refugee, Human Rights, Norm Diffusion, Norm Cascade, Regional 
Solidarity
1. INTRODUCTION
The image of a refugee child, Alan Kurdi, who drowned on 2 September 2015 in the 
Mediterranean Sea, made global headlines and reminded the international society of the 
significance of refugee crises. According to the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees (UNHCR), the number of refugees rose to 14.4 million in 2014. As of 16 February 
2017, almost 5 million people have fled Syria since 2011, and as of 8 March 2016, 1,400,883 
refugees have left South Sudan since 2013. In addition, 183,483 refugees fled Yemen during 
2016.  
However, refugee crises are not new in world politics. They have been a persistent 
problem in the post-World War II international system. During the Cold War, the resettlement 
of refugees was largely accepted by the Northern countries as part of their foreign policy 
within the context of the ideological conflict between East and West. However, the advent 
of the post-Cold War era remarkably changed their perception of resettlement. First, the 
arrival of massive refugee flows as a result of protracted civil strife and wars during the 
last few decades has made responsibility-sharing a buzzword among recipient countries. 
Second, developed countries in Western Europe and North America, notwithstanding their 
emphasis on international cooperation for refugee assistance, explicitly or implicitly showed 
their intention to maintain or reduce refugee caseloads on account of political and economic 
pressures including domestic security concerns and high unemployment rates. 
More broadly, the post-Cold War period saw a shift in how refugees were conceptualized. 
Refugee resettlement, far from demonstrating the superiority of Western liberal democracies, 
as had been the case during the Cold War, was now a political problem, especially as 
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numbers grew. Refugees tended to be perceived as a burden or a source of potential risk 
rather than valuable labor force for growing the economy. Especially, the acceptance of 
resettled refugees is often deemed as a complicated and problematic decision involving a 
wide scope of socio-political considerations such as substantial financial cost, housing, job 
training, education cost for children, and social and cultural integration. Compared to the 
issue of asylum, resettlement entails a much greater investment:  
“Resettlement involves the selection and transfer of refugees from a State in which they have 
sought protection to a third State which has agreed to admit them – as refugees – with permanent 
residence status. The status provided ensures protection against refoulement and provides a resettled 
refugee and his/her family or dependents with access to rights similar to those enjoyed by nationals. 
Resettlement also carries with it the opportunity to eventually become a naturalized citizen of the 
resettlement country” (UNHCR Resettlement Handbook, 2011).
In parallel with the growing securitization of refugee flows was a countervailing emphasis 
on a human rights orientated approach to resettlement, which was announced at the 42nd 
Session of the UNHCR Executive Committee in 1991. The ‘Resettlement as an instrument 
of protection No.67’, which is contained in the United Nations General Assembly Document 
No. 12A (A/46/12/Add.1), stipulated that:
“UNHCR pursues resettlement only as a last resort for vulnerable refugees when neither 
voluntary repatriation nor local integration is possible, when it is in the best interests of the refugees 
and where appropriate.”
Thus, after its redefinition, resettlement has become an instrument of protection rather 
than an expression of Cold War political interests. The UNHCR Executive Committee’s 
announcement influenced the public perception of resettlement as a part of international 
human rights protection policy. Here, Risse, and Sikkink (1999)’s arguments should be noted. 
They contend that international human rights norms bring about an impact on domestic 
changes when they are well institutionalized in international regimes and then compete with 
the principles of sovereign states. 
Even though the Northern countries, which had played key roles as ‘traditional 
resettlement countries’ during the Cold War, appeared to be losing their interest in the issue, 
this period saw a surprising shift. A whole new group of countries stepped up and agreed 
to start participating in annual refugee resettlement programs. Thus, developing countries 
in Europe, Latin America, and Asia, i.e., Ireland, Portugal, the Czech Republic, Romania, 
Hungary, Brazil, Argentina, Chile, Paraguay, Uruguay, and South Korea have established 
their own annual resettlement programs. The first movers of the group were seen in the pilot 
programs of Ireland, Brazil, and Chile, which were launched between 1998 and 1999. What 
factors primarily motivated these countries to launch annual resettlement programs, thereby 
turning themselves into so-called ‘emerging resettlement countries’? Given the fact that these 
programs were initiated not long after the conceptual change of resettlement as the last resort 
for vulnerable refugees, can we say that the emergence of new resettlement countries was the 
result of the diffusion of human rights norms? 
This study examines the changing conception of refugee resettlement in international 
politics and, in line with it, identifies the growing coercive pressure of the traditional 
resettlement countries towards non-participating countries. Thus, the domestic, regional 
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and international contexts related to the decision-making of new resettlement countries 
are explored to find causal linkages. Based on these examinations, we will identify the 
motivational factors to launch the annual resettlement programs within the framework of 
coercion, competition, learning, and emulation from the perspective of policy diffusion 
(Simmons, Dobbin, and Garrett, 2006, 2007).  
2. THEORETICAL APPROACHES ON THE MOTIVATIONAL FACTORS INFLUENCING 
THE ACCEPTANCE OF RESETTLEMENT
Shurke (1998) noted increasing restrictions in response to the mass inflows of refugees 
as the distinctive feature of the international refugee regime during the 1990s. Only 10 
countries, all in the Northern hemisphere, participated in the regular resettlement scheme 
with limited annual quotas although hundreds of thousands of refugees were seeking help 
(UNHCR, 1994; Shurke, 1998: 397). Faced with these refugee crises, ‘burden-sharing’ was 
internationally discussed as a feasible solution. In many instances, the case of the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) as a collective security mechanism served as a point 
of reference for the idea of burden-sharing. However, institutionalized burden-sharing 
system was not established despite its expected benefits such as lower costs for individual 
states and higher efficiency owing to a relatively more organized responses. Shurke (1998) 
suggests that this failure can be attributed to two main reasons. First, although refugee flows 
might increase potential threats in a country both politically and economically, the ‘security 
threat’ posed by refugees could be effectively controlled by the unilateral action of a state’s 
military forces (Weiner, 1996). Therefore, collective action and burden-sharing, which was 
crucial in the establishment of NATO, was not really necessary for the countries dealing with 
refugee problems. Second, the frequency and magnitude of the refugee crises could not be 
forecasted due to their inherent uncertainty. The uncertain prospect of escalating costs might 
lead countries to become hesitant about engaging in and promoting international cooperation 
and participate in burden-sharing. Even though Shurke’s study does not exactly focus on why 
states pursue resettlement, its analysis on the failed institutionalization of burden sharing may 
account for the indifference of the Northern countries to the refugee problems in the South.   
Given the absence of institutionalized burden-sharing, Betts (2008) uses the concept of 
‘Suasion Games’ (Martin, 1993) to examine the determinants that influence the Northern 
countries’ contributions to in-region refugee protection in the South. According to this two-
actor model of ‘Suasion Games’, “There is a stronger actor with little interest in cooperating 
and a weaker actor with little choice but to either cooperate on the terms of the stronger 
actor or to scupper cooperation entirely and so make itself worse off (Betts, 2008: 3)”. If it 
is the premise that Northern countries are strong actors with not many incentives to support 
refugees in the Southern countries, i. e. weaker actors, what factors should be underlined to 
promote the international cooperation between the North and the South? Betts proposes two 
approaches for promoting their cooperation. First, regarding the discrepancy of capabilities 
and bargaining power, the interests of the Northern countries in other issue-areas such as 
migration, security, and trade need to be linked with the refugee protection in the South. 
Northern countries will be more likely to cooperate when they are made aware of these 
interdependencies. Second, the facilitating role of the international human rights regime such 
as the UNHCR can be used to enhance Northern countries’ awareness of the inter-linkage 
across issue-areas. 
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Nevertheless, as Betts (2008) points out, this theoretical framework also has its limitations 
and cannot sufficiently explain the North-South polarization as shown by the results of the 
Convention Plus initiative of 2003-5. Even though the interdependence between the interests 
of the Northern countries including migration management and border security and the in-
region refugee crises in the South was emphasized much more strongly than ever, not much 
tangible voluntary support from the Northern countries materialized, despite the facilitating 
efforts of the UNHCR. Regarding the results, Betts contends that a failure to highlight the 
interdependence may be the principal cause of this failure. Alongside it, the revelations of 
corruption within the UNHCR and increased public concerns of security due to the terrorist 
attacks in the United States on 11 September 2001 may also be suggested as additional 
influential factors (Perrin and McNamara, 2013). However, notwithstanding comprehensive 
analyses, this theoretical approach does not substantially expand its examination into the 
emerging cooperation of annual resettlement between the developing countries in the South 
despite the fact that the whole puzzling picture of the international refugee regime in the 
post-Cold War era still needs to be sorted out. 
Taking into consideration this previous research, our study will further explore 
new annual resettlement countries in the context of international politics and regional 
interdependence, and then examine whether the emergence of new resettlement countries can 
be interpreted as the diffusion of human rights norms from the perspective of competition, 
coercion, learning, and emulation proposed by Simmons, Dobbin, and Garrett (2006). In 
their account of international policy diffusion, i.e., the diffusion of liberalization, these four 
causal mechanisms are identified to describe under what circumstances the policy diffusion 
works. Their key concepts are adapted for this study as follows; 
•  Coercion: It involves power asymmetries that strong actors exploit to impose their preferences for 
policy change on the weak. Powerful actors including governments, international organizations, 
and even non-state actors use the manipulation of incentives to encourage others to implement 
policy change. Coercion can be explicitly or implicitly applied in diverse ways, e.g., through 
the threat or use of physical force, the manipulation of economic costs and benefits, the 
monopolization of information or expertise, etc (e.g. Armada, Muntaner, and Navarro, 2001; 
Owen, 2002; Braun and Gilardi, 2006; Dobbin et al, 2007; Appuhami, Perera, and Perera, 2011). 
For instance, using a strategy of conditionality, primary actors such as powerful governments or 
intergovernmental organizations link policy reform to political membership (e.g. in the European 
Union) or to economic resources (e.g. from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) or the World 
Bank) (e.g. Grabbe, 2001; Daley and Garand, 2005; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2005; 
Brooks, 2002; Brune, Garrett, and Kogut, 2004; Gilardi, 2005). 
•  Competition: Competition among governments explains institutional changes. The competitive 
pressures may have effects on legal models, institutions, and practices (e.g. Baybeck, Berry, and 
Siegel, 2011; Braun and Gilardi, 2006; Shipan and Volden, 2012). Governments know who their 
competitors are and how they can link policy choices to competitive advantage. Regarding a 
special agenda, a government can be particularly sensitive to the policy innovations of competitor 
governments from the perspective of policy diffusion.  
•  Learning: Governments in one country draw lessons from the experiences of others, and apply 
these lessons in designing their own policies at both the simple tactical level (how to better 
achieve a particular goal) and at a deeper level (what goals they should pursue) (e.g. Meseguer, 
2005; Braun and Gilardi, 2006; Shipan and Volden, 2012). 
•  Emulation: The governments of countries will voluntarily adopt new policies by emulating 
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the exemplary policies of leading countries. Policymakers are willing to do their best by 
spontaneously embracing the policies of leaders (e.g. Simmons and Elkins, 2004; Braun and 
Gilardi, 2006; Gilardi, 2016). 
Based upon these four perspectives, the motivational factors behind the acceptance of annual 
refugee resettlement in the sample countries will be individually examined. 
3. THE CHANING CONCEPTION OF RESETTLEMENT AND THE GROWING 
COERCIVE PRESSURE FROM THE NORTHERN COUNTRIES
The coercive pressure of Northern countries is particularly noticeable within the context 
of the changing conception of resettlement. Resettlement was perceived to be the foremost 
durable solution for refugees by Western European countries as well as the US government 
during the Cold War. International politics and foreign policy goals may be the key factors 
to explain the resettlement decisions made by these countries during the period. The 
confrontation between the East and the West not only accounts for the international refugee 
policies of the Northern countries but also suggests clues to understand their changing 
conceptions of refugee resettlement after the end of the Cold War. As Bessa (2009) argues, 
the role of US leadership was crucial to sustain the international refugee regime driven by 
the Northern countries during the Cold War. US officials perceived refugee issues as part of 
national security policy (Loescher, 1994: 357). Therefore, their assistance noticeably focused 
on refugees from the communist countries of Eastern Europe, such as those fleeing from the 
Hungarian crisis in 1956 and the Czech refugees in 1968. 
With the slowing of the economy in the mid-1970s and as an increasing numbers of 
internal war refugees originating from Africa, Asia, and Central America as the results of 
the intensification of the Cold War and consequent proxy wars began to find their way to 
the Northern countries, they began to tighten restrictions on their refugee policies during the 
1980s (Loescher, 1994; Barnett, 2002). The end of the Cold War culminated in the dramatic 
change of refugee resettlement in the Northern countries during 1990s. Given the fact that the 
resettlement mechanisms had been mainly based on the Cold War assumptions (Keely, 2001: 
308), the suggestion that the advent of the post-Cold War era led the Northern countries to 
lose their incentive in participating in resettlement programs seems to have gained traction. 
In the disruptive political environment, repatriation was spotlighted as the preferred durable 
solution for refugees instead of resettlement (Troeller, 2002). In line with the will of the 
Northern countries to keep refugees in their own regions, the UNHCR declared the 1990s 
as ‘the decade of voluntary repatriation’ and promoted it as a durable solution for refugees 
whereas resettlement was redefined as the last resort for vulnerable refugees (Bessa, 2009: 
95). 
These changes, however, further aggravated the refugee crises in the South, which had 
been overwhelmed with massive inflows of refugees from geographically neighboring 
conflict zones such as Bosnia, Kosovo, Albania, Rwanda, and Somalia. As Barnett (2002) 
contends, the Northern countries tended to perceive the increasing refugees from protracted 
civil war, ethnic conflict, and civil disorder as a potential source of threat or burden to their 
political security and economic stability rather than valuable human capital for economic and 
social development. The changing conception of refugee resettlement brought about a shift 
of focal points on the refugee crises from one of the East-West matter to one of the North-
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South issue. On the one hand, the coercive pressure of the traditional resettlement countries 
towards the non-participating countries was increasing in the North. On the other hand, the 
significance and impact of the refugee crises was growing in the South. These accumulating 
pressures were a prelude to the emergence of new resettlement countries.     
4. THE MOTIVATIONAL FACTORS BEHIND THE ACCEPTANCE OF ANNUAL 
RESETTLEMENT: IRELAND, PORTUGAL, THE CZECH REPUBLIC,  
ROMANIA, AND HUNGRARY IN EUROPE
4.1 Ireland
In response to a request by the UNHCR, Ireland launched its annual resettlement program 
in 1998 as the first mover of the sample country group by accepting 10 cases (approximately 
40 persons). What factors primarily motivated the decision of the Irish government within the 
context of the international refugee regime? 
Frist, the coercion of Northern countries via the international organization may be 
considered as the principal determinant. The increasing burden of Northern countries due to 
the persistent refugee crises created coercive pressure towards the responsibility-sharing of 
non-participating countries. Given that the Northern countries, especially in Europe, were 
victims of major refugee crises such as ethnic conflicts in Bosnia in 1992 and the war in 
Kosovo in 1999, as Jubilut and Carneiro (2011) argue, they had to not only ease their burden 
of refugees entering their territories but also cope with declining public support for resettled 
refugees. The growing resettlement gap between demand and capacity drove the Northern 
countries to expect a more active role by the UNHCR. In cooperation with the UNHCR, they 
tried to increase the total sum of resettlement capacity by encouraging the participation of 
new resettlement countries. 
As an effective conditional measure to put pressure on non-participating countries, 
financial assistance for new annual resettlement programs was seen as a viable option for the 
Northern countries. In January 1997, the UNHCR Trust Fund for Enhancing Resettlement 
Activities (Trust Fund) was at last established to financially support pilot projects in emerging 
resettlement countries. Ireland and Iceland in Europe, and Brazil and Chile in Latin America 
were selected to implement the pilot resettlement programs of the Trust Fund respectively 
based on the following criteria (Jubilut and Carneiro, 2011). The country must:
(a) not be a refugee producing country;
(b) have signed and implemented the international legal instruments on refugee protection;
(c) have a UNHCR presence in the country;
(d) appear to offer some local integration prospects. 
Therefore, the coercive pressures which was accelerated by the financing of the Northern 
countries via UNHCR, arguably played a catalyst role to initiate the extended cooperation 
and responsibility-sharing of new annual resettlement countries such as Ireland. In light of it, 
it may be an exemplary case to present the effects of coercive pressure using conditionality.  
Second, the huge number of first-asylum seekers arriving in Ireland around the period 
may be contended as the domestic bottom-up pressure to facilitate the positive response to the 
coercive pressure of the international human rights regime. Although Ireland acceded to the 
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1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees in 1956 and its 1967 Protocol in 1968, 
as Kinlen (2013) point outs, the numbers of asylum seekers arriving in Ireland was small 
until the 1990s due to its geographic and political isolation as an island country. Even if the 
Irish government occasionally received small numbers of Hungarian, Chilean or Vietnamese 
refugees, their acceptance was based on planned programs. However, the sharp increase 
in asylum applications since the mid-1990s fundamentally changed the framework of the 
refugee policy in Ireland. Experiencing an unprecedented problem due to the unpredictable 
influx of asylum seekers, Ireland established the ‘Refugee Act’ in 1996 to strictly regulate the 
arrival and acceptance process of refugees (UNHCR Ireland 2002 Country Operation Plan).
Taking account of refugee inflows as well as the international expectations for 
responsibility-sharing, the establishment of annual resettlement program could be a multi-
purpose policy not only to gain bargaining power in negotiation with the UNHCR but also to 
justify their ensuing refugee legislations for demotivating asylum seekers. Whereas the size of 
annual resettlement was relatively small and did not raise public concerns, the acceptance of 
resettled refugees could be used to counter the arrival of refugees seeking asylum in Ireland 
(Kinlen, 2013). In fact, when faced with increasing arrivals of asylum seekers between 2000 
and 2004, the Irish government devised a wide range of measures to differentiate the rights 
between the Irish nationals and asylum seekers. For instance, a referendum in 2004 finally 
resulted in changing the laws of citizenship to remove the automatic right of children born to 
non-national parents (Kinlen, 2013). Thus, the adoption of the annual resettlement program 
could be used to both externally and internally defend the position of the Irish government 
towards asylum seekers. In brief, the coercive pressures from the Northern countries via 
UNHCR, which combined with the increasing domestic pressures from the immediate 
refugee crises, may be identified as the primary factors that influenced the decision of the 
Irish government.     
4.2 Portugal, the Czech Republic, Romania, and Hungary
Even though Ireland set a precedent as the emerging resettlement country, it would be a 
decade before Portugal, the Czech Republic, Romania, and Hungary started to follow suit. 
Interestingly, three of them adopted their annual resettlement programs around the same time. 
The annual resettlement program was launched in Portugal in 2007, and the Czech Republic 
and Romania in 2008 respectively although Hungary initiated it a bit later in 2012 (e.g. 
Bokshi, 2013). Why did these countries create annual resettlement programs around the same 
time? 
Most of all, the protracted refugee crises and the consequent coercive pressures of 
the Northern countries via both the international and regional refugee regime may have 
influenced their decisions. Although the Convention Plus initiative (2003-5) did not produce 
the remarkable outcomes from the North (Betts, 2008), the continuous in-region refugee 
crises constantly stimulated new trials for the cooperation between the international and 
regional refugee regime, i.e., the UNHCR and the European Union (EU). Notwithstanding 
that the Northern countries perceived the urgency of the refugee issue, it is noted that their 
planned measures were still in line with the 1990s’ conditionality strategy. In other words, as 
shown by the formation of the new refugee fund by the EU, the Northern countries in Europe 
focused on increasing the numbers of new resettlement countries by using their financial 
assistance instead of expanding resettlement within their territories. In 2007, under the 
cooperation of the UNHCR and the EU, the European Refugee Fund (ERF) was established 
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by the participation of all EU Member states except for Denmark with the objective of 
supporting the efforts of EU Member States in bearing the consequences of receiving 
refugees and displaced persons as the part of the EU’s General Program ‘Solidarity and 
Management of Migration Flows’ (European Parliament and Council, 2007). 
As Perrin and McNamara (2013) point out in their examination of motivational factors 
behind the annual resettlement programs in Europe, the ERF and the EU membership may 
be identified as the crucial conditional factors that influenced the decisions of Portugal, 
the Czech Republic, Romania, and Hungary. Paradoxically, the ERF might have had 
dual functions. Taking into consideration the actual financial cost for accommodating the 
resettlement refugees, it might have contributed to relieving the financial burden of new 
resettlement countries by stipulating the details of assistance using the total sum of €628 
million during the period from 1 January 2008 to 31 December 2013 as follows (Government 
of UK European Refugee Fund -General Information, 2015).
“Member States allocations are determined by a formula which is set out in the Basic Act. 
Each Member State receives a fixed amount of between €300,000 and €500,000per annum. The 
remaining available funds are then split with 30 per cent allocated in relation to the number of 
persons falling within categories (a), (b), and (e) of the target groups and 70 per cent allocated in 
relation to the number of persons falling within categories (c) and (d) of the target groups……
Any third-country national or stateless person; (a) having the status defined by the Geneva 
convention and who is permitted to reside as a refugee in any one of the Member States; (b) 
enjoying a form of subsidiary protection within the meaning of Directive 2004/83/EC; (c) has 
applied for one of the forms of protection described in points (a) and (b); (d) enjoying temporary 
protection within the meaning of Directive 2001/55/EC; (e) is being or has been resettled in a 
Member State…… 
In addition, Member States receive a fixed amount of €4,000 for each person resettled who 
falls into one of the following categories: persons from a country or region designated for the 
implementation of a Regional Protection Programme; unaccompanied minors; children and women 
at risk, particularly from psychological, physical or sexual violence or exploitation; persons with 
serious medical needs that can only be addressed through resettlement.” 
Hence, the emergence of the new annual resettlement countries is promoted by linking 
financial assistance with refugee resettlement policy. 
On the other hand, taking into consideration that the ERF was established by the 
economically integrated regional community in cooperation with the UNHCR, the fund itself 
might be construed as increasing regional coercive pressures to the new EU membership 
countries (see e.g. Grabbe, 2001; Daley and Garand, 2005; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 
2005; Gilardi, 2005). Especially regarding the fact that the Czech Republic and Hungary, 
and Romania joined the EU in 2004 and 2007 respectively, these countries were likely under 
pressure to competitively demonstrate their taking part in responsibility-sharing as the newest 
members of the EU (Perrin and McNamara, 2013). Involvement in annual resettlement 
programs may have been the result of tacit coercive pressures imposed by the regional 
solidarity of the EU. 
Given these factors, the emergence of new resettlement countries in Europe might be 
primarily motivated by the coercive pressures of the international and regional refugee 
regime and competitive pressures between new EU member countries rather than the 
diffusion of human rights norms due to the emulation of the best practices of the leading 
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Northern countries.   
5. THE MOTIVATIONAL FACTORS BEHIND THE ACCEPTANCE OF ANNUAL 
RESETTLEMENT: BRAZIL, CHILE, ARGENTINA, PARAGUAY, AND  
URUGUAY IN LATIN AMERICA
5.1 Brazil and Chile 
In Latin America, the coercion of the international regime and regional solidarity 
were also noticeable factors for the countries to make their decisions in favor of annual 
resettlement programs. Brazil and Chile were the first countries to launch annual resettlement 
programs in Latin America in 1999 (UNHCR). As with the case of Ireland in Europe, their 
participation was promoted as part of a set of pilot projects supported by the UNHCR Trust 
Fund for Enhancing Resettlement Activities, which highlights the role of Northern coercion. 
However, it is important for us to holistically approach the annual resettlement programs of 
Latin American countries, especially in the regional context. Notwithstanding that there is no 
integrated political and economic union in this region as like EU, the geographical proximity 
and socio-political interdependence between the Southern Cone countries not only helps us 
understand the emergence of refugee resettlement in the first two countries but also helps us 
examine the subsequent resettlement agreements of Argentina, Paraguay, and Uruguay from 
the perspective of regional solidarity and responsibility-sharing. 
First, the coercive pressure of a regional regime may have influenced the decisions 
of Brazil and Chile (see e.g. Armada et al., 2001; Owen, 2002; Braun and Gilardi, 2006; 
Appuhami et al., 2011). The importance of regional cooperation and national participation 
for resolving the in-region refugee problem beyond the capability of a single state had 
been underlined even before the launch of the pilot annual resettlement programs by Brazil 
and Chile in Latin America. As shown by the adoption of the ‘Cartagena Declaration on 
Refugees’ by the States of Latin America and the Caribbean in 1984, the endemic civil 
wars and consequent refugee crises in Central America such as Nicaragua, El Salvador, and 
Guatemala were perceived to be an urgent regional problem. In this context, the Declaration 
enshrined the principle of non-refoulement and non-discrimination, and redefined the concept 
of refugee in Latin America; 
“In view of the experience gained from the massive flows of refugees in the Central American 
area… …Hence, the definition or concept of a refugee to be recommended for use in the region is 
one which, in addition to containing the elements of the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol, 
includes among refugees persons who have fled their country because their lives, safety or freedom 
have been threatened by generalized violence, foreign aggression, internal conflicts, massive 
violation of human rights or other circumstances which have seriously disturbed public order.” 
As the result of the extended definition of refugees and the immediate inflows of civil war 
refugees from neighboring countries there was a perceived need for heightened regional 
cooperation and solidarity. These socio-political contexts would make countries more 
susceptible to the coercive pressures of the regional refugee regime. 
Second, the protracted refugee crises created a strong push-factor for Latin American 
countries to seek the close cooperation with the international refugee regime, facilitating its 
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coercive pressure. As its reflection, the ‘Cartagena Declaration on Refugees’ emphasizes the 
active involvement of UNHCR and other organizations in the regional refugee issues.    
“To support the work performed by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
(UNHCR) in Central America and to establish direct co-ordination machinery to facilitate the 
fulfillment of his mandate.”
“To request immediate assistance from the international community for Central American 
refugees, to be provided either directly, through bilateral or multilateral agreements, or through 
UNHCR and other organizations and agencies.”
The regional necessity for attracting assistance from the international community might 
facilitate these countries’ flexible responses to requests from the UNHCR. In the context 
of North-South relations, when Brazil and Chile were recommended as the candidates of 
‘emerging resettlement countries’ by UNHCR, it would not be easy for them to turn down the 
offer in light of the importance of international assistance for the region (see e.g. Dobbin et 
al., 2007; Daley and Garand, 2005; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2005; Gilardi, 2005). 
Third, the political background of the two countries could be another motivational factor 
to promote their annual resettlement programs from the perspective of competition. Both 
Brazil and Chile experienced military dictatorship in the past. Brazil had been under the rule 
of an authoritarian military government since the coup led by the armed forces in 1964. The 
military junta stayed in power until 1985 before the opposition leader José Sarney won power 
in a presidential election. Chile had also been ruled by an authoritarian military government 
from 1973 to 1990. The military dictatorship, which had been established by the coup of 
General Augusto Pinochet in 1973, lasted for 28 years before it transferred its power to the 
democratically elected president Patricio Aylwin in 1990 after the defeat of the referendum 
for the extension of Pinochet’s presidential term (e.g. Donnelly, 2007; Smith, 2005). 
The new democratic governments of these countries both needed to differentiate 
themselves from the former military governments (see Hafner-Burton, Mansfield, and 
Pevehouse, 2015). Their own citizens’ experiences as former political refugees during the 
authoritarian period may have increased the external and internal pressures for the Brazilian 
and Chilean governments to accede to the annual resettlement request from the UNHCR. 
For instance, the Brazilian president Cardoso, whose government decided to launch the first 
pilot annual resettlement program in Latin America, had himself been a political exile in 
Chile in the 1960s. As Hafner-Burton et al. (2015) point out that developing countries tend 
to ratify international treaties for their legitimacy, for democratic governments, participation 
in refugee resettlement not only demonstrates their good-will for cooperation with the 
international community but also signals to their own citizens that they are committed to 
democracy and freedom. The similar political backgrounds of the governments might have 
caused this legitimation-seeking to become competitive.      
Fourth, the long presence and support of the UNHCR, particularly in Brazil, might 
have contributed to exert coercive pressure for the launch of an annual refugee resettlement 
program. Notwithstanding the fact that the Brazilian government had not officially recognized 
it as an international organization until 1982, the UNHCR established its office to assist the 
resettlement of regional refugees in Rio de Janeiro in 1977 with the support of the former 
Archbishop of São Paulo, Cardinal Paulo Evaristo Arns. The office organized the resettlement 
caseloads of approximately 20,000 refugees who had arrived in Brazil with a tourist visa 
from Chile, Bolivia, Argentina, and Uruguay (Fischel de Andrade and Marcolini, 2002: 
THE EMERGENCE OF NEW RESETTLEMENT COUNTRIES 115
37). Particularly, since the end of the military junta in 1985, the new Brazilian government 
showed a cooperative attitude toward the UNHCR office in Brazil, and regularized relations 
with it in 1989. Most of all, the first ‘Refugee Act’ in the Southern Cone was ratified in 1997 
and was drafted in close collaboration with the UNHCR (Fischel de Andrade and Marcolini, 
2002). This refugee law led to the establishment of the National Committee for Refugees 
(Comité Nacional para Refugiados – CONARE). The CONARE designed refugee policies 
and procedures in cooperation with government, civil society, and the UNHCR (Nogueira 
and Marques, 2008). It is noted that the CONARE later worked to implement the pilot 
refugee resettlement projects promoted by UNHCR. Therefore, the presence of the UNHCR 
dating back to the 1970s amplified the pressure to implement an annual resettlement program 
in the 1990s. 
5.2 Argentina, Paraguay, and Uruguay
The annual resettlement programs of Argentina, Paraguay, and Uruguay might have 
been catalyzed by the coercive pressure of the regional refugee regime, which was 
demonstrated by ‘Mexico Declaration and Plan of Action to Strengthen the International 
Protection of Refugees in Latin America (MPA).’ It was convened in Mexico City on the 
20th anniversary of the Cartagena Declaration in 2004 and established a series of measures 
to identify the solutions for refugees of the region. Most of all, concerned with vulnerable 
Colombian refugees in need of urgent protection and humanitarian assistance near the border 
areas between Colombia and its neighboring Ecuador, Panama, and Venezuela, the MPA 
emphasized regional solidarity as one of its fundamental principles to guide state policies on 
refugees in Latin America. Furthermore, it saw resettlement as one principal pillar of durable 
solutions for coping with the refugee crises in a framework of regional solidarity;   
“Taking into account the socio-economic conditions prevailing in the countries of asylum, as 
well as the distinct profiles of refugees and other persons in need of protection in the region, it 
is necessary to design and implement creative new policies to facilitate the search for adequate 
solutions. This requires devising new strategies to achieve self-sufficiency and local integration, 
both in urban centers as well as border areas, as well as the strategic use of resettlement, in a 
framework of regional solidarity.” 
The MPA also underscored that the ‘Regional Resettlement Solidarity Program’ is in line 
with international solidarity and responsibility sharing;  
“In the preparatory meeting held in Brasilia (26-27 August 2004), the Government of Brazil 
proposed the creation of a regional resettlement programme for Latin American refugees, in the 
framework of international solidarity and responsibility-sharing…… 
……Furthermore, based on the experience of Brazil and Chile as emerging resettlement 
countries, they appeal to the international community to support the strengthening and consolidation 
of these initiatives, in order to improve and replicate them in other countries of Latin America. 
In any case, it is underlined that resettlement, as a durable solution in the region and for the 
region, should not be viewed as “burden-sharing” but, instead, as a duty deriving from international 
solidarity, and the need for technical and financial cooperation from the international community 
for its strengthening and consolidation was reiterated.”
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Soon after the regional resettlement solidarity program had been stipulated in the MPA, 
Argentina agreed to receive the resettled refugees in the same year, 2004. The other two 
countries of the Southern Cone, Paraguay, and Uruguay subsequently established their 
‘Solidarity Resettlement Program’ in 2007. According to Ruiz (2015), from 2005 to 2014, 
some 1,151 refugees, mostly Colombian, from Ecuador and Costa Rica, and another 363 
refugees from outside Latin America, mostly Palestinians and Syrians, were resettled in 
Brazil, Chile, Argentina, Paraguay, and Uruguay. These results may imply the effectiveness 
of the coercive pressure from the MPA as the regional refugee mechanism.  
Second, the competitive pressure due to the common political experiences might also 
have encouraged the decisions of Argentina, Paraguay, and Uruguay (see e.g. Baybeck et 
al., 2011; Braun and Gilardi, 2006; Shipan and Volden, 2012). Although it is possible that an 
emphasis on regional solidarity could accelerate the establishment of resettlement programs, 
only three countries, Argentina, Paraguay, and Uruguay, among the 20 countries of the 
Southern Cone that adopted the MPA, actually launched an annual resettlement program. 
With the regional context of solidarity on the refugee crises, the socio-political background 
of the five Southern Corn countries, Brazil, Chile, Argentina, Paraguay, and Uruguay may 
provide some clues to understand their positive responses to resettlement acceptance.
In the same way as the cases of Brazil and Chile, the next three countries to create 
resettlement programs, Argentina, Paraguay, and Uruguay, also experienced military 
dictatorships. Argentina, under the rule of its military junta between 1976 and 1983, headed 
by Jorge Refael Videla, experienced massive human rights violations such as kidnappings, 
forced disappearances, tortures, and extrajudicial murders. The citizens of Uruguay and 
Paraguay also suffered military dictatorships between 1973 to 1985, and 1954 to 1989, 
respectively (e.g. Donnelly, 2007; Smith, 2005). Given the circumstances, the following two 
points are particularly note-worthy;
a) All five of the military juntas in Brazil, Chile, Argentina, Paraguay, and Uruguay took 
over the power by overthrowing the former governments by the military coups, and then 
egregiously suppressed their own nationals with the justification of anti-communism and 
national security. During the oppressive ruling, they had shown the type of networked ‘state 
terrorism’ symbolized by, so called, ‘Operation Condor.’ McSherry (1999) describes it as; 
“A shadowy Latin American military network whose key members were Chile, Argentina, 
Uruguay, Bolivia, Paraguay, and Brazil. Condor represented a striking new level of coordinated 
repression among the anticommunist militaries in the region.”
b) Four of them were finally replaced by new governments between 1985 and 1990 
through their democratic presidential elections. Only the head of Paraguayan military 
government, Alfredo Stroessner Matiauda was ousted from power by the coup in 1989 and 
Juan Claros Wasmosy was elected as the first civilian president in 1993 by the democratic 
election based on the new constitution (e.g. Donnelly, 2007; Smith, 2005).  
The political suppression under authoritarian governments and the resulting 
democratization demonstrate the socio-political interdependence between the five countries. 
In other words, as the democratically elected governments of the Southern Cone, which had 
experienced remarkable changes in world politics around the same period, were particularly 
susceptible to competition towards democratic progress symbolized by the creation of annual 
resettlement programs, not to mention the coercive pressure of regional solidarity.   
Third, the learning effects of prior cooperation need to be considered (see e.g. Meseguer, 
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2005; Braun and Gilardi, 2006; Dobbin et al., 2007; Shipan and Volden; 2012). As 
founding member states, Brazil, Argentina, Paraguay, and Uruguay have participated in the 
Regional Agreement for National of Member States of the Common Market of the South 
(MERCOSUR) since 1991. It was aimed to establish a common market and consolidate 
political, economic, and social integration among its states parties. Chile was also involved 
in it as an associate state. This may symbolically demonstrate the economic interdependence 
between the Southern Cone states. On the one hand, the mutual interdependence may 
increase the competitive pressure to work together for the responsibility sharing in times 
of refugee crises. On the other hand, the precedent for open migration policy within the 
regional economic bloc, even before the MPA, may ease the resettlement decisions through 
its learning effects, as illustrated by Cavaleri (2012: 48); 
“In 2002, after a series of xenophobic attacks against regional migrants, MERCOSUR permitted 
nationals of the six countries (Brazil, Argentina, Paraguay, Uruguay, Chile and Bolivia) to reside in 
the territories of others and granted them to access to any economic activity on an equal basis with 
nationals.”  
Given the coercive, competitive, and learning dimensions within the framework of 
the regional solidarity in the Southern Cone, it suggests that the acceptance of annual 
resettlement by Brazil, Chile, Argentina, Paraguay, and Uruguay is not principally motivated 
by the diffusion of human rights norms.  
6. THE MOTIVATIONAL FACTORS BEHIND THE ACCEPTANCE OF ANNUAL 
RESETTLEMENT: SOUTH KOREA IN ASIA
6.1 South Korea 
Coercion by the UNHCR and the competitive pressure between Japan and South Korea 
also played a role in the development of annual resettlement programs in East Asia. In 2015, 
South Korea started its pilot annual refugee resettlement program only five years after the 
first program launcher, Japan. Taking into account that there is no regional union such as the 
EU, and no regional refugee initiative such as the MPA, what factors account for the annual 
resettlement program of South Korea? 
First, the exploitation of underlying competitive pressures by the UNHCR should be 
noted to understand the decision of the South Korean government. Consistent with the 
prevalent tendency of the Northern countries in the post-Cold War era, Japan has also 
focused on the financial and logistical support for the refugees rather than the admission of 
resettlement or asylum seekers in its territory (e.g. Vayrynen, 2001; Strausz, 2012). As the 
result, Japan has been one of the top donors to UNHCR along with other Northern countries 
such as the United States and the EU. Both Japan and South Korea had been deemed to be 
reluctant to receive refugees together (e.g. Koh, 2008; Shin and Shin, 2013). 
However, the director of the Immigration Bureau, Mr. Inami, who played a key role in 
the decision-making process, recalls that the appeal by the new UNHCR Representative was 
the turning point for the Japanese government to seriously consider a resettlement program 
(Takizawa, 2011: 31). Along with the appointment of the former Immigration Bureau of the 
Ministry of Justice as the first Japanese Representative, the UNHCR Tokyo Office promoted 
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both public advocacy for a resettlement program and a ‘quiet diplomacy’ through informal 
meetings with officials of the Ministry of Justice (MOJ) (Takizawa, 2011: 31). Takizawa 
(2011: 31) argues that: 
“While reminding MOJ officials of the strong criticism made by Ms Sadako Ogata, the former 
UN High Commissioner for Refugees, that “Japan (meaning MOJ officials) lacks humanity” 
in dealing with refuge (The Japan Times, 7 July 2007), UNHCR “sold” the “benefits” of the 
resettlement program from the point of view of the MOJ. One of the MOJ’s obsessions was the 
possible security implications of accepting larger number of refugees. UNHCR pointed out that 
Japan does not need to be concerned about the possible security risks because candidates for 
resettlement to Japan will be background checked and selected by UNHCR. MOJ then can choose 
those refugees who Japan deems better fit for resettlement to Japan……UNHCR also suggested that 
the pilot program could be fairly a small one, possible a few families, …... Accepting only a small 
number of refugees initially would also prevent possible opposition to the resettlement initiative. 
Thus, a resettlement program meets the interests of the refugees, the MOJ and UNHCR.”
In the summer of 2007, after six months of quiet dialogue with UNHCR, a “study group 
(benkyo-kai)” was established to understand an annual refugee resettlement program with 
participation of the middle-level managers of the Ministry of Justice, Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, and the Cabinet Office. Subsequently, in November 2007, during his visit to Japan, 
the UN High Commissioner for Refugees António Guterres was informed by the Japanese 
government that the internal consultation process for resettlement had started (Takizawa, 
2011: 32). Japan finally agreed to establish a resettlement pilot project annually receiving 30 
Myanmarese refugees from Thailand in 2008. Beginning with the first caseload, 27 refugees 
in 2010, total 86 refugees were resettled in Japan during the period between 2010 and 2014 
(Treviranus and Törngren, 2015).   
It is also noticeable that UNHCR’s Assistant High Commissioner for Protection, Erika 
Feller visited South Korea right before the Tokyo symposium on asylum in Japan, and called 
for the legislation of refugee law to establish a more comprehensive and reliable system for 
refugee protection. Her comment during the visit may reflect the exploitation of underlying 
competitive pressures on the South Korean government (Moriya and Yoo, 2009);    
“South Korea is a very important country in this region. It can offer very good examples to the 
rest of the region in terms of integrating protection cases. A lot of experience has been accumulated 
by helping North Koreans who came into South Korea…..We hope that some of this experience will 
also be used to develop integration programs for third country nationals. We are looking to South 
Korea to play a leadership role in this region.”
And then, in the subsequent symposium in Tokyo, the former UNHCR High Commissioner 
Sadako Ogata acknowledged Japan’s resettlement adoption with these complimentary 
remarks (Moriya and Yoo, 2009);
“Japan is not only a major donor to UNHCR, but also accepted 11,000 Indochinese refugees 
after the late 1970s. It has announced plans to become Asia’s first resettlement country when it 
begins accepting Myanmar refugees from camps in Thailand under a pilot scheme next year.”
Second, the spotlighted pilot annual resettlement program of Japan put unavoidable 
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pressure on South Korea in terms of the competition between two countries in international 
community. Just right after the symposium, on May 27, 2009, the ruling Saenuri party, 
congressman, Woo-Yeo Hwang proposed the Refugee Act to the National Assembly; and 
then, as the first ‘independent refugee law’ legislated at the national level among the East 
Asian countries, the National Assembly finally passed the ‘Law on the Status and Treatment 
of Refugees’ at the plenary session on December 29, 2011(APIL, 2012). Since the enactment 
of the refugee law, in July 2013, the first group of 22 Myanmar refugees arrived in South 
Korea on December 23, 2015.   
Given the timeline of all these procedures pertaining to the establishment of the 
Refugee Act and the subsequent annual resettlement program, it appears undeniable that 
increasing coercive pressure was put on the South Korean government by UNHCR as well 
as competitive pressure by the neighboring country, Japan. In this regard, the proposed 
refugee numbers are also noteworthy. The Korean government originally planned to invite 
30 refugees who were at a town bordering Thailand and Burma (Myanmar) although that 
projected total was not met in the end (Ock, 2015). The proposed refugee numbers and 
the origins of South Korean resettlement program are exactly same as those of the initial 
implementation decision of the Japanese government. Regarding the implications of a series 
of relevant events, the participation of South Korea in the annual resettlement program 
could be interpreted to be derived from the coercive and competitive pressures from the 
international organization and the neighboring Japan in competition rather than the raised 
awareness of human rights norms and their diffusion.
7. CONCLUSION
In the post-Cold War period, resettlement was deemed as the prominent durable solution 
and part of human rights framework. Therefore, the emergence of new resettlement countries 
is likely to be perceived as the diffusion of human rights norms. However, when it comes 
to tracing the motivational factors behind the decisions of these emerging resettlement 
countries, this study finds important inconsistencies.
First, even if it is conceded that the concerns of human rights advocacy account for the 
resettlement programs in traditional resettlement countries of Europe and North America, the 
contrasting responses of these countries to refugee crises during the Cold War and the post-
Cold War era imply that their resettlement policies were heavily influenced by their political 
and economic interests. In particular, they lost their political incentives to pursue resettlement 
programs after the collapse of communism. Faced with an influx of refugees, they showed 
a tendency to focus on financial support rather than allow the arrival of refugees in their 
own territory. In line with this, they devised ways to increase responsibility-sharing via the 
coercive pressures of international organizations such as the UNHCR. 
Second, a more human rights friendly conception of resettlement as the last resort for 
protecting refugees in plight in the 1990s did not automatically lead to new annual refugee 
resettlement programs. Rather, these countries in Europe, Latin America, and Asia were 
implicitly or explicitly influenced by the coercive pressures of international or regional 
refugee regimes using conditionality such as membership to the regional union or financial 
assistance. Furthermore, in response to the immediate refugee flows, close political and 
economic interdependence in terms of region solidarity catalyzed competition among 
countries that saw refugee resettlement as a form of legitimation. Therefore, it may be 
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argued that the emergence of new resettlement countries was not primarily motivated by the 
diffusion of human rights norms. 
Third, our research results suggest that effective regional mechanisms equipped with 
financial capability may substantively contribute to improving the protection of refugees 
and overcome the impasse between North and South. In light of the emerging resettlement 
countries in Europe and Latin America, regional solidarity and responsibility-sharing based 
on political and economic interdependence may play a crucial role in promoting programs 
for refugees and can supplement the joint efforts of the international refugee regime. 
Therefore, it may lead to more practicable ways to provide durable solutions to refugee 
crises in the context of domestic and regional demands. In this respect, particularly, in Asia, 
the establishment of regional mechanisms for advocating human rights as well as refugee 
protection may have notable significance given the fact that there are no tangible human 
rights mechanisms for vulnerable refugees in the region. 
Finally, although the results of this study help us better understand the motivational 
factors behind the decision to implement refugee resettlement programs, the research 
has been based on primary and secondary literature but without in-depth individual or 
focus group interviews of pertinent government policy-makers. Hence, future research is 
recommended to specify these motivational factors in more detail through the testimony of 
government officials and the collection of additional supporting data. Nevertheless, we hope 
that this study may contribute to a better understanding of international attempts to protect 
refugees in plight and, ultimately, contribute to the creation of more robust and responsive 
protections for those in need.     
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